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vAbstract
The United States identifies the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, as
the greatest potential threat to global security in the post-Cold War era. Despite a considerable emphasis in this
area, only South Africa has voluntarily rolled back its nuclear weapons capability. (“Nuclear rollback” occurs
when a nation eliminates its nuclear weapons, relinquishes at least some of the technical means to acquire
nuclear weapons, or accepts a control regime to prevent it from going nuclear.) Unfortunately, South Africa’s
actions apparently came in spite of U.S. nonproliferation measures.
The primary focus of this paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful development
and subsequent rollback of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the key milestones in the
development of South Africa’s nuclear weapons capability. It also relates how different groups within South
Africa (scientists, politicians, military, and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa’s
nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback
given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests.
The conclusions drawn from this effort are that the South African nuclear program was an extreme response
to its own “identity crisis.” Nuclear weapons became a means of achieving a long-term end of a closer
affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation—and receive guarantees
of its security—rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western
support to counter a feared “total onslaught’ by communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same
South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent—and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved
economic and political integration with the West.
Several recommendations are offered for critical review of the above issues to include the need for greater
international dialogue and constructive engagement with threshold nations such as India and Pakistan.
Nonproliferation regimes can be used to promote mutual verification, transparency, and the resolution of mutual
security concerns. More than anything, policy makers must be prepared to assist threshold nuclear states in
resolving their core regional security concerns if they wish to encourage states to pursue nuclear rollback.
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1Introduction
Too small to be picked up by radar, the South African bomb arched up to twelve thousand meters before
descending in a gentle curve across the ten kilometers between its release point and target.
After fierce debate, Pretoria’s mission planners had picked the Cuban T-62 tank battalion as their
primary target. Ordinarily, two battalion strongpoints could have been included in the bomb’s inner kill
zone, but the tanks represented most of the Third Brigade Tactical Group’s combat power. The planners
were willing to accept “minimal” damage to the rear of the column in order to guarantee destruction of the
Cuban armor . . .
Fused for airburst, it detonated over and just outside the northwest edge of the tank battalion’s
laager. A boiling white-hot fireball, more than two hundred meters in diameter, speared through the
night—turning darkness into flickering, man-made day for several deadly seconds . . .
The two forward battalions in the Third Brigade Tactical Group were wiped out in one swift, merciless
moment. The middle two battalions lasted only five seconds longer. Ten seconds after the South African
fission bomb went off, the brigade’s fifth and final motor rifle battalion lay shattered in its debris-choked
laager.
Several thousand men lay dead or dying among the hundreds of wrecked vehicles littering Route 47.
Gen. Antonio Vega’s Third Tactical Group had been annihilated.
Larry Bond, Vortex
Larry Bond’s vision of a South Africa using nuclear weapons to stop a large-scale Cuban combined arms
assault in the novel Vortex is eerily similar to the original purpose Pretoria claimed as the driving requirement
for its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent. In reality, South Africa’s leadership feared just such a Cuban assault in the
late–1980s at the height of tensions with Angola and Namibia. With more than 50,000 Cuban troops along its
border, South Africa faced its worst nightmare: the potential for a “total onslaught” by communist forces that
the South African Defense Force (SADF) could not overcome. South Africa reportedly targeted the Angolan
capital city of Luanda with a nuclear weapon in order to precipitate Western intervention into the conflict had
the Cubans invaded.1 Instead, the United States and the Soviet Union helped Angola, Namibia, and South
Africa reach a negotiated settlement that achieved the withdrawal of both Cuban and South African military
forces from the conflict area. Unlike the novel, South Africa’s “insurance policy”2 against a breakdown in the
peace negotiations led to a successful outcome by securing Western intervention without a single nuclear
detonation.
Just over a year after securing regional stability with its insurance policy South Africa became the first
nation in history to ever rollback its nuclear capability. Nuclear rollback occurs when a nation voluntarily
achieves one or more of the following: eliminates its nuclear weapons, relinquishes at least some of the
technical means to acquire nuclear weapons, or accepts a control regime to prevent it from going nuclear. This
paper looks at South Africa’s nuclear rollback in terms of how its leadership exerted pivotal influence over its
deterrent program from birth to dismantlement. The central question it addresses is how did the national
identity, technical capabilities, and regional security issues coalesce into a nuclear deterrent for the Republic of
South Africa (RSA) and what prompted its dismantlement?
I contend nuclear weapons were an extreme expression of South Africa’s desire to be linked to the West.
This created a challenge for U.S. foreign policy in balancing its opposition to apartheid (racial separateness) and
the need to support nuclear nonproliferation. U.S. policy focused on pressuring the Republic of South Africa’s
nuclear program to achieve leverage for concessions on nonproliferation and domestic policy reform. This
policy missed the chief objective of the RSA’s interest in pursuing a nuclear deterrent. It focused on the
symptoms of South Africa’s identity crisis (for example, unsafeguarded nuclear program and apartheid), not its
root causes (desire for Western security guarantees).
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The paper is divided into four sections: The first describes the key milestones in the birth, life, and
dismantlement of the South African nuclear program. The next section describes the dynamics of how a small
core of leadership directed the actions of the program in concert with a much broader objective. The third
section offers an explanation for why dismantlement was consistent with South Africa’s long-term interests in
seeking a close affiliation to the West. The final section discusses how the RSA nuclear program demonstrates
the profound challenge to U.S. policymakers of achieving the proper policy balance to engage threshold nuclear
states on proliferation issues. For the purposes of this paper, the nuclear program is broadly divided into an
early, middle, and end phase. The phases roughly correspond with the initial development period from the
1950s until 1977, the development and production of deliverable nuclear weapons from 1977 until 1989, and
the end phase from 1989 until its public acknowledgement in 1993.
3The Program Begins
We can ascribe our degree of advancement today in large measure to the training and assistance so
willingly provided by the United States of America during the early years of our programme.
A. J. Roux (Frank V. Pabian “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program”)
South Africa’s quest for a nuclear deterrent capability required the acquisition of at least four basic elements:
raw materials (uranium or plutonium), the ability to enrich the materials to weapons grade, trained personnel
and adequate facilities, and the capability to acquire or manufacture components required for the nuclear device.
The early days of South Africa’s nuclear program focused on civilian nuclear applications: the development of
reactors for research and power production and the enrichment of uranium for reactor fuel. The details of this
early phase are well documented. However, the critical bomb production stage of the program remains clouded
by official South African government reluctance to reveal specifics and the destruction of virtually all files
related to the nuclear program. Table 1 at the end of this section summarizes key milestones in the RSA nuclear
weapons program.
The acquisition of raw materials was easy; South Africa’s pursuit of cheap nuclear energy was based on its
abundant supply of natural uranium resources. In fact, South Africa established itself as a uranium supplier to
the U.S. nuclear weapons program (and subsequently, the United Kingdom’s program) during the closing days
of World War II.3 According to Richard Betts, South Africa provided approximately 40,000 tons of uranium
oxide to the United States valued at approximately $450 million.4 In return, South Africa sent more than
ninety of its scientists and technicians for training at U.S. nuclear research installations5 and began its own
civilian nuclear research and development program for “peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.” The United States
also agreed to supply South Africa with a nuclear research reactor (SAFARI-I),6 train additional scientists and
reactor technicians, and provide fuel for the reactor under an agreement reached in 1957. These arrangements
provided South Africa with a firm foundation to conduct its civilian nuclear research and development (R&D)
program. The flow of personnel, equipment, and fuel under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards continued up until 1976 when the United States halted its support in response to South Africa’s
refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).7
Early Phase
The success of South Africa’s civilian research coupled with its interest in using nuclear reactors for power
production prompted work on uranium enrichment.8 The need to produce 45 percent enriched uranium for its
SAFARI-I reactor led to the construction of the Y-Plant, a pilot uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba.9 This
facility is adjacent to the Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center located approximately 35 kilometers west of
Pretoria. The plant used a unique aerodynamic process to separate the U-235 from the U-238; South Africa
frequently cited the need to keep the process proprietary as the rationale for blocking international inspections of
the enrichment plant.10
Parallel to the fuel enrichment efforts, South Africa embarked on research into peaceful nuclear explosives
(PNEs). In 1969 the Atomic Energy Board (AEB)11 formed a group to evaluate the technical and economic
aspects of nuclear explosives.12 In 1971, then Minister of Mines Carl De Wet secretly approved work on
“preliminary investigations” into producing nuclear explosives.13 No actual development work was conducted;
the work was limited to theoretical investigations and literature searches on the feasibility of both implosion
and gun-type nuclear devices.
The Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) gave priority to work on the mechanical and pyrotechnical aspects
of gun-type designs (similar to the U.S. atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima) over work on an implosion
design.14 The gun-type design likely gained favor because it satisfied South African safety concerns, contained
no plutonium,15 used no high explosives (reduced risk of accidental detonation), and accommodated a separable
design (could be stored in sections for added safety and security).16 An additional incentive may have been that
a gun-type design did not necessarily require a live test to validate the design.17 In 1974, Prime Minister
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Balthazar J. Vorster authorized the nuclear program to proceed under the aegis of peaceful uses (for example,
large excavations, harbors, mines, and so forth) and approved the funding of a test site in the Kalahari Desert to
quantify the results of their theoretical work. Despite the “peaceful” nature of all these investigations, South
African officials cloaked the program in extreme secrecy. 18
Despite the secrecy, visitors to South Africa during the 1970s report the AEC scientists were proud of their
efforts and privately revealed their nuclear research.19 They found the scientists to be well trained and pursuing
their work with an attitude of “wanting to show the world what South Africa can do.”20 Many during this early
stage had studied abroad, but in later years the opportunities for overseas training and contact through
international conferences were severely reduced. This likely contributed to a highly parochial worldview on their
part, but does not appear to have impeded their technical skills in refining the gun-type design.
The Aborted 1977 Test
South Africa proceeded from theory to practice with the construction of a nuclear test site. From 1975–76,
engineers successfully drilled two test shafts more than 250 meters deep for conducting nuclear tests at the
Vastrap military base located within the Kalahari Desert. The AEC planned the 1977 test to validate the nuclear
device’s design less its highly enriched uranium (HEU) core (also referred to as a “cold” test).21 In the aftermath
of India’s nuclear test in 1974, South African leaders were confident there would be little or no long-term
international outrage more than an overt “declaration by detonation” of its capability to produce nuclear
explosives. While the effort to develop nuclear explosives was considered a state secret, no attempt was made to
conceal the supporting test infrastructure equipment and facilities. The AEC had completed the test device,
described as a “monster” by 1977.22 Some reporting indicates the AEC planned to conduct a second test
approximately one year later with a real HEU core following a successful cold test.23
We did indeed receive information that South Africa was preparing for an atomic explosion, which,
according to the South African authorities, was for peaceful purposes. We know what a peaceful atomic
explosion is; however, it is not possible to distinguish between a peaceful atomic explosion and an atomic
explosion for purposes of military nuclear testing. We therefore warned South Africa that we would regard
such testing as endangering all the peace processes under way and as having a potentially serious
consequences with respect to our relationship with South Africa.
24
Unfortunately for South Africa, a Soviet surveillance satellite detected the preparations for a nuclear test in
August 1977, and Soviet authorities immediately notified the United States. While denying such a test was
imminent, South Africa was forced to cancel its planned test in the face of strongly-worded demarches from
several nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and France.25 The abrupt cancellation of the test
transformed South Africa’s existing program from the exploration of nuclear explosives to the development of a
viable nuclear deterrent. This led to a shift in program management from the AEC to the South African
Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR). 26 The original nuclear test article was reportedly more than three metric
tons in weight, but AEC scientists succeeded in reducing the size of the device by a factor of five.27
The “Double Flash of ’79”
On 22 September 1979, a U.S. surveillance satellite detected a brief, but intense double flash of light
emanating from an area over the South Atlantic near the Cape.28 Coming less than two years after South Africa
was forced to stand down its nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert, it brought increased attention on South Africa
and the extent of cooperation with a close ally, Israel. Although it quickly denied it had conducted a test,
rumors persist until the present day about possible South African involvement in a nuclear test. Analysis of its
HEU production29 indicates the RSA could not have produced sufficient weapons-grade uranium in time to
support a test. Suspicions voiced at the time of the event pointed toward Israel as the source of the device tested
with South Africa playing only a limited supporting role.30 Recent press reporting appears to confirm these
suspicions although understandably neither party is willing to confirm their involvement in the test.31
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Nuclear Weapons-Related Facilities
The transition from a nuclear “device” to a nuclear deterrent led to a significant improvement in the facilities
supporting the RSA nuclear program. The program essentially occupied four sets of facilities over the life of the
program. Initially, the AEC secretly worked on the nuclear program in downtown Pretoria, but then moved to
the Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center in the mid-1960s. At Pelindaba, the AEC designed and produced the
initial nuclear device and a second, smaller device.32 AEC scientists reportedly conducted their one and only
critical test for the HEU core used in South Africa’s weapons at Pelindaba.33 Pelindaba also had facilities for
machining high explosives (HE) for implosion weapons and for supporting testing and firing sites. AEC
personnel monitored the production of HEU and continued advanced weapons design research for the remainder
of the nuclear program—with the latter at a much slower rate and very low priority.34
The transfer of nuclear weapons production responsibility to ARMSCOR led to the construction of the
Kentron Circle facility (later named Advena) located approximately 20 kilometers west of Pretoria. ARMSCOR
was made up of engineers vice physicists and therefore proceeded with the development and production of
deliverable nuclear weapons based on the gun-type design in a “businesslike and unimaginative way.”35 The
Circle facility, constructed in 1980 and commissioned in May 1981, comprised two innocuous-looking
buildings located deep inside the boundaries of an ARMSCOR complex used for high-speed vehicle testing on
various road surfaces.36 The Circle facility was also well-equipped to conduct work on implosion weapons with
a capability to develop test diagnostics, HE test cells to perfect explosives placement for proper core
compression and metal machining equipment for the cores.37 However, ARMSCOR engineers focused the bulk
of their efforts on producing a highly reliable gun-type device and never altered the original physics package
design provided by the AEC. 38 ARMSCOR never placed a high priority on advanced weapon designs—despite
extensive if slow research—until it became a possible means to extend the life of the program.
ARMSCOR successfully lobbied the government in the mid-1980s to construct the final major weapons-
related facility, Advena Central Laboratories. Work began on construction of the facility to expand nuclear
delivery options to ballistic missiles. This new facility appeared to be well equipped to accelerate work on
advanced warhead designs and provided the capability to mate nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles.39 A
collaborative effort with Israel was already underway to develop an intermediate-range ballistic missile
(ostensibly a “space launch program” based on the Jericho II with a maximum range of approximately 2000
kilometers).40 The SADF believed a ballistic missile capability was necessary to counter the increasing
vulnerability of its aging Buccaneer aircraft to Cuban air defenses.41
The Advena facility was completed just as the RSA nuclear program was terminated. The additional
production and research capacity of the Advena facility could have increased weapons production and
simultaneously increased the pace of work on advanced warhead designs.42 ARMSCOR had set the goal of
upgrading the nuclear arsenal by the year 2000 when the decision was made to terminate the program. Advanced
warhead designs such as implosion weapons and even boosted fission designs (to increase the yield from 15–20
kilotons to as much as 100 kilotons) were being reviewed as part of the stockpile upgrade plan.43
Access to Critical Technology and Components
As noted earlier, foreign assistance was critical to the South African nuclear program during the 1970s. In
addition, the absence of uniformly enforced nonproliferation controls during the 1960s and early 1970s worked
in their favor as well. According to a declassified CIA estimate, “the South Africans have had little difficulty
acquiring materials and technology essential to their nuclear weapons development program.”44 South Africa
had already acquired the key components needed for its fuel enrichment process and basic nuclear explosive
work by the time the Carter administration moved to tighten export controls, limit training of personnel, and
cutoff the supply of nuclear fuel.45 In addition, the United States applied these controls unilaterally; many
European nations continued to supply equipment to South Africa.46
South Africa’s choice of a conservative gun-type design lends itself to a “low tech” solution that was
relatively unimpeded by nonproliferation controls. Where equipment could not be obtained, South African
technicians relied on creative solutions or modified uncontrolled items to serve their requirements. In one
instance, the Y-Plant’s enrichment process design required the indigenous development of a reliable seal for use
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between two sets of rotating machinery.47 In another case, ARMSCOR technicians used a two-axis machine to
create the complex, three-dimensional shapes needed to fabricate parts of the gun-type device.48
The AEC and ARMSCOR personnel were also consistently aware of the need to maintain a “low profile”
to avoid the attention of Western intelligence services. The acquisition of critical materials and dual-use
supplies was done through a variety of suppliers and in small quantities to reduce chances of detection. South
Africans tacitly acknowledge circumventing export controls to obtain selected items, but understandably refuse
to name the source or methods used to acquire these items.49 As Frank Pabian notes the overall impact of
nonproliferation controls in effect when South Africa developed its weapons was to slow production and work
on advanced designs by making it harder to acquire components and supplies in a consistent fashion.50
The United States and the international community also succeeded in reducing South Africa’s prestige in
the international nuclear arena. In 1977, South Africa was removed from its seat on the IAEA Board of
Governors and replaced by Egypt. The seat was reserved for the “most advanced nuclear country in Africa”51 and
South Africans felt it had been unfairly taken from them. To add insult to injury, South Africa was refused
participation in the 1979 IAEA General Conference in an attempt to compel it to join the NPT. Ironically, the
conference was being held in New Delhi, India. AEC Chief Executive Officer Waldo Stumpf noted India had
detonated a nuclear explosive, refused to sign the NPT and yet they were not suffering a similar pariah status
being levied upon South Africa. 52
Building the Weapons
In spite of these restrictions, ARMSCOR personnel established a nuclear weapons production line at their
Circle facility. The AEC had produced a second device in late 1979 at Pelindaba, but it was suitable only for
use in a test and was not deliverable.53 ARMSCOR completed its first pre-production model in 1982, but this
model was only deliverable by “kicking it out the back of a plane.”54 ARMSCOR engineers worked to refine
the overall weapon design in terms of safety, reliability, and security while holding the AEC-designed and
validated physics package constant. The heavy veil of secrecy surrounding the RSA program, small staff (only
about 35 of the 100 personnel employed at Circle in the early 1980s actually built the weapons), and the need
to build some items in-house slowed the pace of the program.55 The work force grew to approximately 300
personnel in 1989 with roughly half involved with weapons production. 56
At the same time, the Y-Plant was producing the necessary HEU to support the weapons program after
some initial problems with the production line. The enrichment process used the centrifugal effect of spinning
uranium hexafluoride and hydrogen gases inside a tube to separate the heavier uranium-238 fraction from the
lighter uranium-235 fraction. The South Africans “fine-tuned” this process by trial and error over time to
produce HEU. Technical problems plagued the process throughout its operation; in one instance, a chemical
contamination forced the entire production line to shut down from 1979 to 1981.57 The best estimate places the
total Y-Plant HEU production at 550 kilograms.58
Weapons Details
ARMSCOR invested heavily in refining and qualifying the various parts of the weapon with an emphasis on
safety and arming features. While the gun-type design had the advantage of not using explosives59 there were
still considerable challenges to prevent accidental detonation if the weapon was dropped. ARMSCOR engineers
developed a unique means of physically preventing an accidental detonation prior to final arming, but the
mechanical devices involved took several years to qualify and eventually proved extremely difficult to
maintain.60 The weapons were stored as two halves in separate vaults as an additional safety feature. The design
was actually divided into four segments consisting of an inner nuclear section made up of two parts containing
the HEU core plus an external, two-part non-nuclear section for aerodynamic stability and guidance.61
According to ARMSCOR, the HEU core consisted of two pieces—one piece shaped like a sphere with a hole in
its middle with the second piece in the shape of a cylinder designed to fit in the hole.62 At detonation, the
cylindrical piece of HEU would be propelled down a high-strength gun barrel into the spherical piece of HEU to
generate an estimated yield of 10–18 kilotons.63 The production version reportedly weighed approximately
1000 kilograms, had an overall length of 1.8 meters, and a diameter of 0.65 meters.64
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The small size of ARMSCOR’s actual bomb assembly group, their strong emphasis on weapons
certification and qualification, the requirement to indigenously shape and manufacture several bomb
components, and limited supplies of HEU held the production rate to roughly 1–2 weapons per year. The final
inventory at program termination was eight active weapons: six operational (five air deliverable, one test
device); one weapon under construction (intended to be a test device); and one weapon (without an HEU core
assigned) for training purposes.65 Several sources cite the total RSA nuclear inventory at “six and a half”
weapons; this appears to stem from the exclusion of the training device from the accounting.66 A unique feature
of the ARMSCOR design was an apparent capability to mate the air-deliverable warheads to ballistic missiles
under construction when the program terminated.67 This flexibility could have enabled the South Africans to
“mix” and “match” their limited nuclear stockpile among the available aircraft and ballistic missiles.68
The Kalahari Revisited
The RSA’s nuclear program reached full tilt in the 1987–1989 period as the regional security situation turned
against South Africa. The early SADF successes against Soviet-supported Angolan forces were reversed and the
Soviets were supplying these forces with superior military equipment. 69 Cuban leader Fidel Castro deployed an
additional 15,000 troops in support of a series of offensive operations along the Angolan–Namibian border area.
He predicted a “serious defeat” for South African forces should the need arise to launch operations deep into
Namibia.
Fortunately, the increased Cuban pressure along South Africa’s borders and SADF deployments in
response to the Cuban’s presence did not result in any major confrontations. The parties agreed to a cease-fire in
August 1988, but Cuban forces remained threateningly close to the RSA’s northern borders.
The South African leadership responded by carefully playing their “nuclear card” to underscore their
determination not to be overwhelmed and to make it clear to the United States and the Soviet Union that an
extremely unpleasant alternative to a negotiated settlement was available.70 Prime Minister Botha ordered
ARMSCOR officials to inspect and make ready the abandoned test site in the Kalahari Desert for a possible
short-notice nuclear test. 71 Mitchell Reiss reports the South African leaders elected this course of action as a
means of signaling their resolve to the United States and the Soviet Union over reaching an acceptable solution
to the withdrawal of Cuban forces.72
South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha raised the stakes even further by informing the world press that
“South Africa had the capability to make a nuclear weapon should we want to,” but refused to provide further
details.73 Whether intended as a warning or not, the comments underscored South Africa’s determination not to
be overrun and to see its border areas secure should peace talks stall. The end result was Cuba, South Africa,
and Angola formally agreed to Namibia’s independence and a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban forces in a
December 1988 agreement. Therefore, unlike in the novel Vortex, South Africa achieved the withdrawal of
Cuban forces from its border area by enlisting the aid of the United States and the Soviet Union by
demonstrating, but not detonating a nuclear weapon.
Nuclear Rollback
The withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet-supported forces from its border marked the high water mark for the
RSA’s use of its nuclear deterrent. ARMSCOR’s efforts to breathe new life into the nuclear program could not
reverse a declining trend in its priority. F. W. de Klerk was elected president of South Africa in September
1989 when Pieter W. Botha was forced to step down because of failing health. He immediately took steps to
begin dismantling South Africa’s nuclear arsenal and prepare for the nation’s accession to the NPT. The
weapons were dismantled beginning in July 1990 and work was completed by September 1991 with all of the
HEU removed from the weapons and transported to Pelindaba for storage.74 South Africa signed the NPT on 10
July 1991 and the nuclear safeguards agreement entered into force on 16 September 1991. The IAEA began its
inspections in November 1991 and spent nearly two years reviewing the full scope of South Africa’s nuclear
program.
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It was not until 24 March 1993 that President de Klerk publicly revealed to the Parliament and to the
world that South Africa had embarked on an ambitious effort to build nuclear devices and had then dismantled
them. Waldo Stumpf estimated the total nuclear deterrent program costs at approximately 680 million Rand
($500 million) 75 over the lifetime of the program. Other sources estimate the total cost as closer to 7 billion
rand ($5.1 billion) given the nearly one billion rand annually allocated to the AEC at the program’s peak.76
These figures may define the program’s size, but the truer measure of its effectiveness was its core leadership.
This small group of politicians, scientists, military personnel, and technocrats nurtured the nuclear program,
matured it into a deterrent capability, and finally terminated it when it no longer served their best interests.
Table 1. Key Events in the South African Nuclear Weapons Program
77
Year Activity
1950s and 1960s Scientific work on the feasibility of peaceful nuclear explosives and support to nuclear power
production efforts.
1969 AEB forms group to evaluate technical and economic aspects of nuclear explosives.
1970 AEC releases report identifying wide applications for nuclear explosives.
1971 R&D for gun-type device approved for “peaceful use of nuclear explosives.”
1973 AEC places research priority on gun-type design over implosion and boosted weapon designs.
1974 PM Vorster authorizes funding for work on nuclear device and preparation of test site.
1977 AEC completes assembly of nuclear device (less HEU core) for “cold test” in the Kalahari Desert.
Soviet Union and United States detect preparations for the nuclear test and pressure South Africa
into abandoning the test.
AEC instructed to miniaturize device; groundwork laid for ARMSCOR to take program lead.
1978 Y-Plant uranium enrichment plant produces first batch of HEU.
Three-phase strategic guidelines established for nuclear deterrent policy.
Botha “Action Committee” recommends arsenal of seven nuclear weapons and ARMSCOR
formally assumes control of program.
1979 “Double-flash” event detected; first device with HEU core produced by AEC.
1982 First deliverable device produced by ARMSCOR; work continues to improve weapon safety and
reliability.
1985 ARMSCOR strategy review expands original three-phase strategy to include specific criteria to
transition to next deterrent phase.
1987 First production model produced; total of seven weapons built with an eighth under
construction at program termination.
1988 ARMSCOR revisits Kalahari nuclear test site and erects a large steel hangar over test shafts and
prepares the shafts for a possible nuclear test.
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa formally agree on Namibia’s independence and schedule for
Cuban troops to withdraw from Angola.
1989 F. W. de Klerk elected President and orders weapon production halted.
1990 Y-Plant formally shut down and nuclear weapons dismantlement begins.
1991 South Africa signs the NPT and enters into a comprehensive safeguard agreement.
1993 President de Klerk publicly discloses details of former South African nuclear deterrent program.
9The Key Players behind the Program
It is possible that South Africa has leap-frogged the testing phase and is concentrating on the
weaponizing and delivery of its nuclear explosive device. Afrikaners are a contingency-minded people and
as such probably would prefer to have a deliverable nuclear weapon rather than be forced to develop one
hastily in the face of a worsening security situation.
Central Intelligence Agency
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The ebb and flow of the South African nuclear deterrent effort is all the more remarkable given the small
number of personnel involved (1000 total and no more than 300 at any one period) and those actually
responsible for key programmatic decisions (reportedly between six and twelve). The decisions emerged from
the synthesis of four basic groups—the scientists, the politicians, the military, and the technocrats—who
shaped the focus and direction of the program. The scientific zeal and drive of the AEC’s Ampie Roux and
Wally Grant to demonstrate that South Africa could make a nuclear device established the technical foundation
for the program.79 Yet their work was not done in isolation from the political leadership, the support of the
military on military-to-military cooperation matters, and the technocrats for actual weapons production.
The strong leadership of the ruling Nationalist Party supported the AEC’s research during the 1950s and
1960s before molding it into a key element of national strategy in the 1970s. Prime Minister B. J. Vorster
presided over the decision to pursue “peaceful nuclear explosives” and the aborted Kalahari nuclear test. His
successor, P. W. Botha, exerted tremendous influence over nearly the entire life of the program. He initially
served as defense minister from 1966–1980 and simultaneously served as defense minister, director of the
National Intelligence Service, and prime minister from 1978–1980.80 In fact, President Botha approved the
recommendation to proceed with development of a seven-weapon nuclear deterrent strategy in 1979.81 He also
streamlined the State Security Council (composed of the Prime Minister, ministers of defense, foreign affairs,
justice, and peace; and the senior minister) into a powerful decision-making body for national security issues in
relative secrecy.82
The military exerted strong influence within the State Security Council (SSC), but their role focused
primarily on domestic security and conventional military operations.83 The two defense ministers overseeing
the nuclear program were P. W. Botha and his handpicked successor, Gen. Magnus Malan. Under Botha, the
defense minister’s power was merged with that of the prime minister’s in supporting the nuclear deterrent
program. Under Gen. Malan it appears the military’s direct influence over the course of the nuclear deterrent
program was more limited, although they remained engaged at some level as the ultimate customer for nuclear
weapons.
Finally, the technocrats—the engineers at ARMSCOR—exerted heavy influence over the nuclear program,
particularly during its critical middle stage. ARMSCOR Managing Director Tielman de Waal headed a
corporation that not only produced nuclear weapons, but also established the capability to mate the weapons
with ballistic missiles.84 There are also indications ARMSCOR was involved in more than just producing
munitions—it also worked in developing the nuclear strategy itself. Together, these four groups formed a
partnership that conceived, produced, and then discarded South Africa’s nuclear deterrent. Yet in the end, the
political leadership exerted the pivotal influence over the program’s progress. Table 2 illustrates the increasing
and decreasing influence exerted by the four groups over the life of the program.
Table 2. Relative Influence of Key Players
Level of
Influence
Early Phase
1950s–1977
Mid-Phase
1977–1989
End Phase
1989–1993
HIGH Politicians & Scientists Politicians & Technocrats Politicians
MEDIUM Military Military Technocrats & Military
LOW Technocrats Scientists Scientists
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Whether or not the West approves, South Africa firmly plants itself in the NATO camp dedicated to the
defense of the West against its enemies . . . in return, the Republic expects the West to come to its defense.
Colin Legum, South Africa, 1964
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The Early Phase
For more than two decades, AEC scientists received the strong support of the South African senior leadership
in its efforts to develop peaceful nuclear explosives. Their achievements were discussed in the previous section;
the emphasis here is on the pivotal influence the politicians exerted during this phase. The political leadership
firmly established the foundation for their long-term objective of maintaining close and continuing ties to the
West. It viewed itself more as defending Western interests on the African continent—particularly against the
forces of communism embodied in the Soviet Union. The SADF and the technocrats were the benefactor of
increased defense budgets, but the focus was on conventional armaments. The SADF also initiated a flourishing
military technology exchange program with Israel during this period—laying the foundation for future nuclear
cooperation efforts.86
The worldview of South Africa’s political leadership (for example, the ruling Nationalist Party) came
sharply into play during this period; the Nationalist Party aligned itself with the West and actively pursued
membership in a Western alliance (to include NATO) to gain security guarantees.87 South Africa eventually
succeeded in gaining an alliance of sorts under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement to provide the British Royal
Navy use of a base near Cape Town in exchange for sales of military equipment to the SADF.88 Although
rebuffed by NATO, South Africa’s senior leadership were convinced their nation’s geostrategic position, wealth
of critical materials, and staunch opposition to communism would gain it favor—and military support—from
the West. The party leaders believed these attributes would also allow them to continue their domestic policy of
apartheid and maintain a favorable balance of power in the region. 89
What they had not counted on was the dual challenge of rising internal opposition by the black majority,
led by the African National Congress (ANC), and international ostracism caused by its apartheid policy. As the
ANC gained power and influence, the government increased the severity of its responses and lost international
support. Incidents such as the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre of sixty-nine unarmed protesters significantly
increased international opposition to apartheid.90
The 1970s added another challenge to the Nationalist Party—eroding regional stability. The April 1974
overthrow of the Caetano regime in Portugal led to the breakup of its colonies in southern Africa. The cascading
effect was a security threat along South Africa’s northeastern border from a pro-Soviet, Marxist–Leninist
government in Mozambique. Less than a year later the Alvor Accords—intended to lead to a peaceful transfer of
power in Angola, Portugal’s other colony—broke down almost immediately after they were signed. South
Africa’s attempted intervention in the ensuing civil war was unsuccessful, and yet another pro-Soviet
government—this one reinforced by the presence of 50,000 Cuban troops—was established in a nation bordering
South Africa to the north.
Shifting U.S. Policy
The Angola experience highlighted what South Africa regarded as lukewarm U.S. support for its battle against
communism. South Africa had intervened in the civil war with the tacit support of Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and the tangible support of covert U.S. funding.91 However, the United States was forced to
terminate this support when Congress and the public learned of the covert aid.92 Consequently, South Africa
could not sustain the effort without the U.S. assistance and was forced to withdraw. At the same time, the
United States canceled an existing nuclear fuel supply contract for the SAFARI-I reactor. To make matters
worse, the United States refused to refund the money South Africa had already paid for the fuel.93 These
activities underscored to the South African leadership the limits of Western support for security and consistent
economic trade. It seemed apparent to the South African leadership that some other means had to be applied to
secure Western support in times of crisis.
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These experiences all occurred concurrently with successful AEC preliminary work on nuclear devices. As
international pressure increased over its apartheid policies, the Nationalist Party put forth the concept that South
Africa faced a “total onslaught.”94 The concept was based on four points: “the sense of an all-out threat to South
Africa’s survival; a belief that its enemies are directed by the Soviet Union; a feeling of having been abandoned
by the West; and a fear of massive conventional attack.”95 From South Africa’s perspective it was alone, ill-
equipped to meet regional security concerns, and being unfairly punished by the West for its domestic policies
despite its staunch anti-Communist stand on the African continent.
The South African response to the challenges of a “total onslaught” was the development of a “Total
National Strategy.”96 It defined a roadmap for the use of political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools for
a long-term effort to develop effective responses to internal and external national security threats. The strategy
resulted in a doubling in the size of the SADF and the tripling of its defense budget over the latter half of the
1970s.97 Under Defense Minister P. W. Botha’s guidance, the SADF was transformed to meet the new threats
with the establishment of a Conventional Force and Counterinsurgency and Terrorism Force.98 The intent was
to counter the growing threat from Soviet-supported surrogates along its northern borders and counter increasing
internal ANC terrorism, respectively. As a final step, the peaceful nuclear explosives program was
continued—and plans were made for its eventual weaponization.
The great powers which have nuclear weapons have adopted an odd attitude. One would have thought that
it would have been tactically more profitable for them to draw closer a potential member of the nuclear
club, which South Africa is. Their bullying attitude could result in making us a maverick bull in the nuclear
herd, and that is surely not a sound situation from their point of view. South Africa will go its own way
and its own interests will be decisive.
Editorial, Beeld, 1977
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Middle Period:
The Rise of ARMSCOR
As discussed earlier, South Africa pursued a “peaceful atomic test” only to be pressured into aborting it by the
United States and Soviet Union. This situation led to the rise of ARMSCOR as the lead agency for developing
South Africa’s nuclear deterrent as Prime Minister Botha transitioned the nuclear “device” into a nuclear
“weapon” and established the Republic’s first nuclear deterrent strategy.100
Initially approved in 1978, it called for a three-phase strategy of nuclear deterrence. The strategy’s focus
was not on warfighting, but rather on creating the proper political conditions to induce favorable Western
intervention if a crisis threatened South Africa. According to Albright, the 1978 strategy was based on the
following elements:
•  Phase I was the standing peacetime posture of denying the existence of a South African nuclear
capability. If a crisis ensued and South Africa found itself with its “back to the wall,” it would move to
the next phase.
•  Phase II called for covert revelation of its nuclear capability to Western countries (especially the United
States). If unsuccessful,
•  Phase III called for an underground test of a nuclear device to demonstrate the nuclear capability
existed. If nations remained unconvinced, a contingency existed to conduct an aboveground
detonation [emphasis added] to demonstrate an operational nuclear weapon capability.
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South African officials deny Phase III implied there was ever any “strategy for operational application of
nuclear weapons.”102 Others believe there is evidence indicating the South African senior leadership had given
strong consideration to the operational use of their nuclear arsenal. For example, ARMSCOR officials admitted
during a 1995 press briefing that the Angolan capital city of Luanda was targeted for a nuclear strike had peace
talks failed and hostilities broken out again in 1987.103
Along with the political decision to establish a nuclear strategy, the middle phase also spawned what
Robert Kelley refers to as the “second bomb program.” Kelley notes, “almost every nation has two nuclear
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programs; one visible and the other much less so.” 104 In the case of South Africa, the aborted Kalahari test led
to the rise of ARMSCOR and its technocrats as the “second bomb program.” ARMSCOR transformed the
South African program from a fledgling exploratory effort into a full-scale weaponization and production effort.
It ignored any attempts by the AEC to pursue advanced weapons designs within any priority until it became a
means of extending the life of the nuclear program. Meanwhile the AEC continued to draw the attention of
Western intelligence services with its focus on such advanced designs and its proximity to the Y-Plant HEU
production facility.105
ARMSCOR emerged as having influence over nuclear matters second only to that of the State Security
Council. According to David Albright, “ARMSCOR exerted tremendous autonomy within the nuclear
program.” On paper, ARMSCOR worked for the South African Air Force in developing nuclear weapons, but
enjoyed unprecedented access to the state president. In fact, ARMSCOR reportedly expanded the original three-
phase nuclear strategy into a 30- to 40-page document establishing specific criteria and preconditions
corresponding to each phase of the original strategy.106 ARMSCOR’s intent was to provide a very detailed
description of the specific political, military and diplomatic conditions to be achieved at each decision point
leading up to the possible use of nuclear weapons.107
ARMSCOR’s involvement in developing South Africa’s nuclear deterrent strategy raises serious questions
about the nature of the strategy. Both Mitchell Reiss and James Doyle viewed the original three-phase strategy
as being characterized by an “…air of unreality.”108 Another individual familiar with the South African nuclear
program is convinced the entire strategy was developed well after the fact to obscure what was a haphazard
decision-making process.109 The real bottom line is the strategy targeted the United States, not an invading
Soviet surrogate. The objective was to compel U.S. action; to do so required extraordinary means to insure that
the weapons were secure and no possibility of inadvertent release existed.
This provides a strong rationale for why ARMSCOR personnel were uninterested in modifying the original
weapons design because the focus was on credible possession of a nuclear weapon, not its specific yield. The
criteria as a credible and reliable deterrent required only that it induce Western intervention; any yield (for
example, anywhere between 0.001 and the desired 10–20 kiloton) would suffice.
ARMSCOR’s emphasis on arming and safety mechanisms and elaborate precautions in the storage of the
weapons reflected the strong political influence over the program’s implementation. The military did not retain
any day-to-day control over the devices; they were stored partially disassembled in separate vaults at
ARMSCOR’s Circle facility. The vaults could only be opened with the approval of the state president and
required the codes of at least four officials to gain sufficient access to the vaults to assemble a single weapon.110
There is limited information on the military’s influence over the nuclear weapon requirements beyond
ensuring physical-electronic compatibility with their Buccaneer aircraft. Reportedly, the SADF had developed
some contingency targeting lists to support the nuclear program.111 Given the program’s political emphasis, any
requirement to deliver more than one weapon to generate a response from the West would likely be
counterproductive. There is little indication the military gave the employment of nuclear weapons much
emphasis although they did begin practicing nuclear dive toss deliveries as early as 1976.112
The military reportedly did play a leading role in coordinating clandestine arms and technology transfers
between South Africa and Israel.113 This included the transfer of approximately 50 metric tons of South African
yellowcake (uranium ore concentrate) in exchange for 30 grams of tritium to support AEC work on boosted
fission weapons.114 Other exchanges of military technology and work on joint ventures reportedly included
technical knowledge acquired from the cancelled Israeli “Lavi” fighter program to the South African Cheetah
fighter and the joint Israeli–South African space program.115 The latter effort provided South Africa with a
ballistic missile delivery capability using a modified Jericho II missile.116
The AEC scientists were relegated from a position of “first to worst” in terms of influence over the nuclear
program. They resigned themselves to researching boosted fission weapon and implosion weapon designs for
which there was no customer and no hope of increased funding. ARMSCOR did bring several AEC scientists
over to its Advena Central Laboratories late in 1988 to support its implosion weapon research, but the program
was canceled before much work could be accomplished.
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End Phase:
Eliminating the Nuclear Weapons
The final phase of the nuclear program began with F. W. de Klerk’s election as president of South Africa. As
had been the case throughout the program, the political leadership focused on evaluating the utility of the
nuclear arsenal in meeting its objective of being a part of the West. By 1989, regional security issues had been
resolved and the Soviet Union was no longer viewed as being the mastermind behind every challenge to the
Nationalist Party’s authority. President de Klerk took full advantage of this situation in reassessing the value of
the nuclear deterrent as a means to achieve their long-term ends with respect to the West.117 Unlike the Cold
War period, the new security situation and increased international opposition to apartheid made it clear South
Africa would face more, not less ostracism and economic sanctions if it retained its nuclear deterrent capability.
Reiss credits President de Klerk’s visionary leadership during this period as pivotal in making the choice to
abandon nuclear weapons.118
The decline of the nuclear program (and shortly thereafter, the ballistic missile program) left ARMSCOR
in a position of waning military influence as the nuclear stockpile was dismantled. It has however, attempted to
increase its commercial success by converting its armament facilities to nonnuclear activities. The scientists and
the military were left to provide limited technical support and security for the route used to transfer the HEU
from the dismantled weapons back to a secured storage area at the Pelindaba Nuclear Research Facility,
respectively.
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A Nuclear Program is Dismantled
South Africa required five years to build its first nuclear device and a total of sixteen years to construct its
six-weapon arsenal. Ending the program, however, took less than twenty-four months.
Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 1979
At no point was the influence of South Africa’s political leadership over the nuclear program greater than at its
termination. The transition from a nation determined to sustain its nuclear capability into one committed to a
nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa reflected a change in means, but not ends for its national security strategy.
The facts of the decision-making process are straightforward: President de Klerk assumed office in 1989,
terminated the program shortly thereafter, and South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991. However, the small
core leadership involved in the nuclear program remains reluctant to discuss their specific motivations for
shifting South Africa’s means to achieve its ends in such a short period of time.
U.S. Actions and South Africa’s Reactions
The dismantlement itself was a reflection of how South Africa’s leadership—primarily President de
Klerk—balanced the need to rollback its nuclear capability with the concurrent requirement to radically reform
its domestic policies. In many ways, the two issues of nuclear rollback and domestic reform were linked. As
Frank Pabian and Mitchell Reiss note, much of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts focused on South Africa did
more to isolate, rather than engage it to achieve a nuclear rollback.119 A key factor was the United States could
not completely address the South African nuclear issue because of legal restrictions imposed by Congress to
punish South Africa for its apartheid policies.
As noted earlier, the United States largely had to “go it alone” to enforce nonproliferation sanctions against
South Africa. The result was largely ineffective measures to compel South Africa to accept international nuclear
safeguards. One reason for the ineffectiveness of this policy was it sent very mixed signals to the government in
Pretoria regarding the true nature of the sanctions.120 In some cases the desired effect was to slow the growth or
proliferation potential of South Africa’s non-safeguarded nuclear program. On the other hand, the United States
applied restrictions on trade and the exchange of nuclear technology and materials in response to growing
disapproval of South Africa’s policy of apartheid.
One of the more telling points was the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Carter
administration used this legislation as the justification for refusing to provide nuclear fuel for the SAFARI-I
reactor after South Africa had already paid for the fuel.121 According to Pabian, this action led South Africa to
judge the United States as an unreliable supplier and spurred the development of an indigenous nuclear fuel
production effort and to some extent, the decision to proceed with its nuclear weapons program.122
Consequently, U.S. policy to minimize proliferation by punishing South Africa for not joining the NPT
backfired and resulted in a greater, not reduced proliferation risk.
The United States may have enacted tough legislation, but South Africa merely looked to its European
suppliers to sustain its nuclear fuel production program and weapons R&D. European nations such as France,
Germany, and Italy123 continued to sell equipment to South Africa and are credited with supplying the bulk of
the equipment needed to support its gun-type design and continued research on advanced weapons. Although
the United States led the way in adopting a set of voluntary nuclear export controls under the Nuclear Suppliers
Group in 1977, it was not until 1992 that dual-use equipment was included under export controls.124
The nuclear restrictions initiated under the Carter administration continued under subsequent
administrations, but a change of emphasis occurred under the Reagan administration. The Reagan
administration promoted the concept of “constructive engagement” with South Africa that was intended to
foster dialogue between Washington and Pretoria. However, this approach reduced policy emphasis on nuclear
nonproliferation in exchange for expanded discussion of a way ahead on political reform (for example, transition
to black majority rule).125 Unfortunately, the United States could not afford to reward South Africa for progress
on political reforms under this approach if nuclear nonproliferation measures were not adopted. This resulted in
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a situation where U.S. nonproliferation policy could not make substantive progress on measures to curtail the
South African nuclear program from 1976 until 1989.126
South African leadership took a calculated gamble during the Cold War that U.S. regional security interests
in Africa were more important than South Africa’s domestic policy shortcomings. South African Prime Ministers
Vorster and P. W. Botha were convinced in a situation of East versus West the United States was unwilling to
give up on South Africa. Their identity as part of the West would be sustained. Had South Africa operationally
employed a nuclear weapon against surrogate forces, some scholars express skepticism about U.S. willingness to
come to their aid.127 Yet the potential loss of the region’s strategic materials to pro-Soviet forces might have won
in a battle of interests between apartheid and increased Soviet regional influence. As in Larry Bond’s novel
Vortex, a U.S. decision to intervene on South Africa’s behalf would likely first require neutralizing South Africa’s
remaining nuclear capability before commencing any decisive operations to repel the invading force.
But that was then . . . in today’s unipolar world, a South Africa in possession of nuclear weapons has
nothing to gain and everything to lose. The risks far outstrip any meager benefits gained as either a declared or
undeclared nuclear state. If a nuclear stockpile was a means to securing an end in the 1980s, nuclear rollback
was the means to the end for the 1990s. William Long asserts that South Africa’s leadership was motivated to
take the measures it did in the late 1980s to insure the West did not totally isolate it.128 Their desire to be a
part of the West, not collapsing regional security, allowed them to take advantage of the “nuclear card” to gain
recognition and support from the West. When viewed in this context, the decision on South Africa’s part to
pursue the development of nuclear weapons—and subsequently, rollback that nuclear capability—is more
plausible and logical than a purely “security-interest driven response.”129
But nuclear rollback and accession to the NPT alone, while perhaps logical in light of the absence of
regional security threats, was insufficient in isolation to achieve South Africa’s goal of continued Western
identity. An NPT-compliant South Africa still under the rule of a minority white government practicing
apartheid could not gain its coveted place in the West. Instead, international pressures to increase the economic
pain of its pariah status would likely have increased.
If apartheid without nuclear weapons was considered counterproductive, there were clearly concerns about a
nuclear-armed South Africa that reformed its racial policies.130 Concerns over proliferation of nuclear technology
or weapons to “rogue” states such as Libya under an ANC-led government would have likely generated equally
heavy pressure to disarm. The solution, therefore, was to conduct the two activities in parallel. President de
Klerk recognized the only way to secure his nation’s future identity with the West lay in a dual-track policy of
domestic reforms and nuclear rollback. Both programs had to move forward in order for South Africa to reap
the fruits of economic prosperity and greater international cooperation and investment.
In the end, President de Klerk was faced with a simple choice. Continue the practices of the Botha regime
or chart a new course in pursuit of a common vision of Western identity for South Africa. One means to the
end via a limited nuclear deterrent capability had run its course with the end of the Cold War. It promised no
economic growth and increasing domestic unrest. A second path renounced nuclear weapons and pursued
meaningful dialogue toward a peaceful transition of power to the black majority. The latter meant radical
changes for the Afrikaner elite, but it offered the potential for greater internal stability and increased prospects of
renewed international investment.
President de Klerk is certainly deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize for his courage to make a radical course
correction in his nation’s path. Yet in a way, he was rewarded for adopting a selfish, yet entirely pragmatic
vision of his nation’s future consistent with its fundamental interests.131 There is no doubt he had to tread
lightly in making steady progress to achieve these goals. The retirement of key personnel associated with the
South African nuclear program132 and the secrecy under which the dismantlement proceeded provided the
opportunity to maximize success. The nuclear program’s cancellation generated some potentially dangerous
backlash among those who lost their jobs. In one instance, sixteen nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
technicians threatened to sell sensitive nuclear weapons information to the highest bidder unless ARMSCOR
paid them one million dollars in unemployment benefits.133 In another situation, two workers were fired and
carefully monitored after it was learned they planned to steal nuclear weapons material.134 These examples
highlight the potential proliferation dangers inherent in nuclear rollback and suggest the need for international
support to minimize these dangers.
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Lessons Learned and Future U.S. Policy Implications
South Africa’s decision to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear deterrent capability and embrace fully its
responsibilities as a non-nuclear-weapon state will guarantee Pretoria an unprecedented place of honor
in the evolution of the international non-proliferation regime.
Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 1995
If nothing else, Pretoria’s experience underscored how quickly, quietly and relatively cheaply nuclear weapons
can be acquired. It also demonstrated an important counter example to the high expectations, but low payoff
observed in the Iraqi nuclear program.135 As several scholars (Albright, Doyle, Kelley, Pabian, and Reiss) have
pointed out, every nation is unique in its path to acquiring nuclear weapons and in one rare instance, rolling
back that capability. The South African program demonstrated the strong pull national identity exerted over the
nation’s leadership to elect such an extreme approach to achieving its end of closer ties to the West.
The political leadership took advantage of its scientists’ eagerness to demonstrate South Africa’s technical
prowess at time when the military had no rational operational requirement to pull it toward developing a
nuclear deterrent. This apparent dichotomy was resolved by linking South Africa’s nuclear strategy to the
reaction of key Western nations and not those of its potential adversaries. From South Africa’s isolated position
and parochial worldview, it made sense. However, President de Klerk came to power in 1989 under a strategic
environment diametrically opposed to the one P. W. Botha had encountered back in 1978. Consequently, any
prospects for a favorable Western response to the existing nuclear strategy were highly unlikely. South Africa’s
core beliefs and interests remained unchanged, but the strategic environment framing those beliefs had changed
substantially. The means to satisfy those interests had to change and that spelled the end of its nuclear deterrent
capability.
For the future, Pretoria’s nuclear weapons experience yields some points that may prove useful in
countering proliferation challenges that are likely to worsen before conditions improve in this post–Cold War
environment. The effects of these recommendations will probably manifest themselves over the long-term; if
anything, South Africa’s rapid nuclear rollback was a welcome exception versus the expected norm in
nonproliferation policy.
Recommendations
Better Enforcement of the Nonproliferation Regime
The increasing level of international controls over nuclear technology has reduced the opportunity for a nation
without a strong industrial base to follow in South Africa’s footsteps.136 Continued U.S. emphasis on arms
control measures and the international nonproliferation regime (NPR) are vital to sustaining momentum for
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This also means taking a leading role in
ameliorating India’s concerns over the CTBT and pursuing the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
These measures can only enhance the effectiveness of existing nonproliferation measures. The overall intent is
to deny a threshold nation the opportunity to conduct any testing and eventually, restrict access to essential
warhead material.
A critical element of this strategy should address greater information sharing to target the illegal removal of
nuclear components or fissile materials from Russia and other newly independent states. Having finally
initiated the process to address dual-use export controls, the United States and its allies must take the lead in
forums such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group to establish a means of exchanging information.
Given that the information is made available, it also demands the resolve to take action to compel nations
to accede to the NPR. This can include policies using diplomatic, political, economic, and if required, military
instruments of national power to exert a strong influence on those nations outside the NPR. Those same
instruments can be used to extend favorable economic benefits and security assurances to nations accepting
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civilian nuclear safeguards while rolling back any nuclear weapons programs. It also includes reassuring our
allies of our renewed commitment to their defense in regions where threshold nations continue to operate
outside of the NPR.
Failure to See the World
from the Threshold Nation’s Perspective
Failure to see the world from the threshold nation’s perspective will virtually guarantee failure of U.S. or
international nonproliferation efforts directed against it. A nation’s perception of its environment—not the U.S.
view—will be crucial to its assessment of the value of nuclear weapons as a means to an end. For South Africa,
the equation balanced in favor of nuclear weapons until the weapons became a roadblock on the path to real
progress in achieving their fundamental interests. United States nonproliferation measures, motivated in large
part by opposition to apartheid, did little to address the “identity crisis” that justified South Africa’s nuclear
deterrent capability during the Cold War. The United States must be prepared to understand and engage the
nations within a region over their core interests and security concerns to promote regional stability and
encourage further nuclear rollback. 137 This is not at odds with the first recommendation; rather, it ensures such
instruments are used for a specific purpose to communicate a desired response by a threshold state.
Nuclear weapons will remain the “coin of the realm” for a nation that sees no other viable option to
meeting its interests and security concerns. Weapons of mass destruction will continue to be perceived as an
asymmetric response to an adversary’s superior capabilities unless fundamental security interests can be
addressed and resolved. For example, the war of words is heating up as Pakistan and India discuss new
initiatives for their respective nuclear weapons programs.138 This situation calls for U.S. intervention, either
bilaterally or in concert with the other nuclear weapons states, to reduce the level of rhetoric between the two
nations and focus attention on addressing the underlying concerns over national prestige and security.
Greater Emphasis on the Environmental and “Opportunity” Costs
Associated with Nuclear Stockpiles
The United States and other nuclear states must raise the profile of the tremendous “opportunity” costs
associated with the acquisition, maintenance, and retirement of nuclear weapons. Partial estimates for
environmental clean up of U.S. nuclear weapons facilities and sites range as low as $30 billion to well more
than $200 billion.139 South Africa devoted a considerable portion of its indigenous resources (fiscal, technical,
and human) to creating and sustaining its nuclear weapons program and supporting infrastructure. More
importantly, a considerable number of its talented scientists, engineers, and technicians invested more than two
decades of work into a program that diverted their creative energies from peaceful civilian research.
Defense Department programs like Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) are now helping Russia and newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union deal with the challenges of eliminating nuclear weapons and
supporting the safety and security of nuclear materials. 140 The CTR program could be expanded with
international support to assist threshold nations in enhancing safety and security of nuclear materials and to
provide economic incentives to aid in conversion of nuclear weapons-related facilities.
The bottom line is Pretoria’s nuclear weapons experience proved it is possible to rollback a nuclear
deterrent capability. A key issue in their development was a lack of security guarantees from the West as part of
their core identity. The lack of clear priority for either domestic reforms or nuclear safeguards in U.S. policy
toward South Africa ultimately limited the effectiveness of nonproliferation efforts. This policy confusion
exacerbated South Africa’s sense of isolation and contributed to the nuclear buildup. U.S. export controls did
not deny South Africa key technology or materials for their weapons, but slowed the program’s capability to
support advanced warhead designs. More importantly, U.S. contributions to stabilizing the regional security
situation altered the strategic environment in such a way to make South Africa’s nuclear deterrent irrelevant and
an impediment to improved international relations.
In the future, nuclear rollback challenges—and opportunities—require a focus on the regional political
issues underlying regional security concerns. The United States and its allies must sustain a nuclear rollback
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dialogue with nations in the Middle East and South Asia to realistically address their security concerns. In
return, India, Pakistan, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and others in these regions must be willing to
thoroughly examine the core interests motivating their pursuit of nuclear weapons. For the United States, the
challenge will remain “staying the course” by sustaining a high priority on regional nonproliferation policies.
The failure to do so could cause the United States to repeat policy missteps that reduced its effectiveness to
target the RSA nuclear program for an early retirement. Nonproliferation goals must be carefully weighed at the
highest level to ensure subordination to other policy goals does not unduly decrease nuclear rollback
opportunities or increase proliferation dangers.
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